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INTRODUCTION 
This action was commenced by the Labor Commission 
(Commission) filing an abstract of judgment with the district court. It 
dealt with a wage payment claim brought by Marc Cummings against 
Derek Price and others. The abstract set out the holdings of the 
Commission's Default and Order to Pay decision. The decision was a 
final agency action. 
The Commission, among other actions, filed a writ of garnishment 
in this action. Mr. Price challenged the validity of the writ of 
garnishment by challenging the Commission's decision. 
No appeal has been taken from the final agency action. Instead, 
Mr. Price asked the district court, in the garnishment proceeding, to 
overturn the Labor Commission's decision and final agency action. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court have jurisdiction to consider the validity 
of the challenged administrative decisions, not on appeal or review, but 
during a garnishment proceeding years later? 
Preservation and Standard of Review 
This issue was raised by the Commission below and was ruled on 
by the district court. R. 169-71, 298-303. This Court reviews the 
district court's conclusions of law de novo "according no deference to its 
resolution of such issues." In re Adoption of Baby B, 2012 UT 35, 'if 41, 
308 P.3d 382. 
2. Did the district court err by not applying res judicata to 
preclude Derek Price from collaterally attacking the Commission's 
decision in the related administrative proceeding? 
Preservation and Standard of Review 
This issue was raised by the Commission below and was ruled on 
by the district court. R. 1 73-76, 303-04. This Court reviews the 
district court's conclusions of law de novo "according no deference to its 
resolution of such issues." In re Adoption of Baby B, 2012 UT 35, 'if 41. 
3. Did the district court err in holding that the Commission 
should have sent notice to Mr. Price by certified mail instead of first 
class mail? 
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Preservation and Standard of Review 
This issue was raised by the Commission below and was ruled on 
by the district court. R. 171-73, 300-01. This Court reviews the 
district court's conclusions of law de novo "according no deference to its 
resolution of such issues." In re Adoption of Baby B, 2012 UT 35, if 41, 
308 P .3d 382. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Marc Cummings filed a wage dispute claim with the 
Commission against Level II Mentoring, L.L.C., and Mad Cow 
Productions, L.L.C.. Mr. Derek Price had been listed as the sole 
manager of the manager-managed Mad Cow Productions from the time 
its Articles of Incorporation were filed through the proceedings before 
the district court. Mr. Price was also listed as a member of the 
member-managed company Level II Mentoring from the time its 
Articles of Incorporation were filed through the proceedings before the 
district court. 
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The Commission mailed to Mr. Price copies of the notice of a 
wage claim, its Preliminary Findings, and its Default and Order to Pay 
to the addresses shown for him on the Commission's records. The 
mailing was done in accordance with the applicable statutes. None of 
these mailings were returned as undeliverable by the U. S. Postal 
Service. 
The Commission filed an Abstract of Judgment in the district 
court. R. 1-2. The abstract set out the unpaid wages, fines, and 
attorney fees established by the Commission's decision. The 
Commission filed the abstract to enforce its decision and obtain for Mr. 
Cummings his unpaid wages. Among other efforts made to satisfy the 
judgment, the Commission filed a writ of garnishment against Derek 
Price . Mr. Price, rather than addressing the writ of garnishment that 
he sought to quash, he filed a motion to set aside the underlying 
judgment, and a reply in support thereof. R. 84-127, 238-53. The 
Commission filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Price's motion. 
R. 165-210. 
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In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the district court held 
that Mr. Price could collaterally attack the Commission's decision. R. 
299-300. It also held that the Commission should be required to 
provide notice in this and similar actions by certified mail, even though 
no statute requires it. R. 300-01. The district court quashed the 
outstanding writ of garnishment against Mr. Price (R. 306) but did not 
set aside the abstract of judgment. R. 304. Instead the district court 
ordered Mr. Price to "pursue a motion to set aside in the administrative 
proceeding with notice to all interested parties." R. 306. The district 
court also denied "at this juncture" Mr. Price's request for attorney fees. 
R. 305. The Commission timely filed its Notice of Appeal. R. 309-10. 
Mr. Price then timely filed his Notice of Cross-Appeal. R. 313-15. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Price's challenge to the Commission's decision is untimely. 
The current action deals with an abstract of judgment and efforts to 
collect on the Commission's decision. Mr. Price can't use this 
proceeding to mount a belated challenge to the final agency action. 
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The district court did not have jurisdiction to address Mr. Price's 
arguments. 
Mr. Price's arguments are also barred by res judicata. A 
garnishment or other proceeding trying to enforce an agency's final 
action is subject to res judicata and can't be used to challenge the final 
agency action. 
The applicable statute requires that the Commission's notices in 
wage claim proceedings be mailed to the parties. The statute does not 
require the use of a particular form of mail, such as certified mail. The 
only times that this Court or the Utah Supreme Court have required 
the use of certified mail is when the legislature has mandated its use by 
statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To 
Consider Derek Price's Untimely Challenge To The 
Labor Commission's Order 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) gives parties 30 
days to file a petition for judicial review from a final agency action. 
Utah Code § 63G-4-401(3)(a). "The timeliness of the ... petition, on 
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the other hand, is a question of jurisdictional significance." Living 
Rivers v. U.S. Oil Sands, Inc., 2014 UT 25, if 18, 344 P.3d 568. In 
Living Rivers, no party sought review of the granting of a permit in 
2008. When a modified permit was granted in 2011, Living Rivers filed 
a petition for judicial review, but sought to challenge the granting of the 
2008 permit. 
The Supreme Court held that it was without jurisdiction because 
the petition was filed more than 30 days after the issuance of the 2008 
permit. Id. at if 21. "The jurisdictional question presented is a matter 
dictated by the substance of Living Rivers' petition for review." Id. 
Because the substance of the petition was directed to the 2008 permit, 
the Court held that was without jurisdiction and dismissed the petition 
as being untimely. Id. 
The timely filing of a petition for review, like the timely filing of a 
notice of appeal, is jurisdictional. Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Serv., 
2007 Ut App 280, if 7, 167 P.3d 1102. Mr. Price did not file a timely 
petition for judicial review of the Commission's decision. 
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Mr. Price could not use this garnishment proceeding to challenge 
those prior decisions; he could only challenge the garnishment itself. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 64D does not authorize a challenge to the 
underlying judgment, only to matters related to the garnishment. "The 
district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider a collateral attack on an underlying judgment in 
the context of the garnishment proceedings." Utah State Tax Comm 'n 
v. Echols, 2006 UT App 19 (Per Curiam). 
While Mr. Price can't use a garnishment proceeding to challenge 
the underlying default decision, he is not left without a possible remedy. 
As a defaulted party, he can ask the Commission to set aside the default 
"by following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." Utah Code§ 63G-4-209(3)(a). This motion would be 
made to the presiding officer who granted the default. Id. § 209(3)(b). 
The decision of the presiding officer would be subject to agency review. 
Id. § 209(3)(c). 
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II. Res Judicata Barred Mr. Price's Attempt To Challenge The 
Labor Commission's Order In A Garnishment Proceeding 
The district court considered Mr. Price's challenge to the 
Commission's decisions. It did not limit its review to questions 
concerning the writ of garnishment that was before it. The district 
court failed to consider the Commission's argument that res judicata 
precluded the court's review of the Commission's decision. Apparently 
the district court accepted Mr. Price's claim that the Commission's 
decisions could be collaterally attacked because the Commission filed a 
civil enforcement proceeding (Abstract of Judgment) with the court. R. 
299-300. 
But this argument was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Career Service Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, 942 
P.2d 933, 939-40 (Utah 1997) (applying res judicata and collateral 
estoppel to prevent the Department of Corrections from collaterally 
attacking the Board's administrative orders in a civil enforcement 
action brought by the Board). "Res judicata, which subsumes the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel, applies to administrative adjudications 
in Utah." Id. at 938 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Mr. Price's claims are barred by the claim preclusion branch of res 
judicata. Claim preclusion has three elements. "First, both cases 
must involve the same parties or their privies." Gillmor v. Family Link 
LLC, 2012 UT 38, if 10, 284 P.3d 622 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). It is undisputed that the parties in the garnishment action 
are the same as those that were before the Commission. "Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first 
suit or be one that could and should have been raised in the first 
action." Id. The issue before the Commission was the claim for 
unpaid wages of Marc Cummings. The Commission determined that 
Derek Price, among others, was liable for these unpaid wages. The 
claims Mr. Price now asserts challenging the Commission's decisions 
could and should have been brought during the agency proceedings. 
"Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits." Id. This element is met as well. Indeed, Mr. Price's attack 
on the Commission's decision is because it is a final judgment that the 
Commission seeks to enforce through this garnishment action. 
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A default judgment is a final judgment for the purposes of res 
judicata. "The Judgment by Default was a final judgment, i.e., one 
which puts an end to a lawsuit by declaring that the plaintiff is or is not 
entitled to recover the remedy sought." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, 
Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Mr. Price's claims are 
barred by res judicata. 
Because res judicata applies, this Court does not need to 
determine whether Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 UT 26, 345 P.3d 655, 
should be applied retroactively. It is undisputed that Heaps held that 
managers and members of Limited Liability Corporations were not 
employers under Utah's Payment of Wages Act. Id. at,, 11-18. This 
is contrary to the prior practice of the Commission. The Commission 
has followed the Heaps decision since it was issued. Res judicata 
precludes Mr. Price from trying to apply Heaps to overturn a final 
judgment that was issued years before it was decided. New precedent 
has been applied retroactively to actions that are ongoing. Heartwood 
Home Health & Hospice LLC v. Rita Huber, 2016 UT App 183, ,, 5, 10-
12, 382 P .3d 1074 (new Utah Supreme Court decision applied 
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retroactively to ongoing action on appeal at the time the decision was 
made). But plaintiffs counsel are unaware of any Utah appellate 
decision that permits a closed case to be reopened so that a new decision 
can be applied to it. 
III. Utah Law Does Not Require The Service Of Notice By 
Certified Mail In Wage Claim Proceedings 
UAPA requires that notices to parties be mailed. Utah Code § 
63G-4-201(2)(b). The Commission has defined mail to mean "first class 
mailing sent to the parties of a wage claim or claim of retaliation, to the 
last known address on the Commission's record." Utah Administrative 
Code R610-3-2(I). Nothing in the statute requires that any particular 
type of mail be used, such as certified mail. But the district court held 
that certified mail was required even though the legislature did not see 
fit to do so. R. 300-01. 
Utah law only requires that notice be sent by certified mail when 
the applicable statute expressly says so. In fact, the Supreme Court 
has held that a prescribed form of service requires only that type of 
service, not something more onerous. For example, in Anderson v. 
Public Service Commission, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), the Court 
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addressed the Utah Motor Carrier Act's requirement that notice be sent 
by certified mail. Id. at 825. The PSC had complied with the certified 
mail requirement, but Anderson still argued that he should have been 
served by personal service. The Court disagreed and held that certified 
mail was adequate and personal service, or proof of actual notice was 
not required: "The most burdensome form of service articulated [in the 
statute] is certified mail. Thus, we can infer that, at most, the 
legislature intended that the Commission be obligated to serve its 
orders by certified mail, not by personal service." Id. 
Likewise, this Court recently held that a statute mandating that 
notice be sent by "certified mail" required notice by U.S. Postal Service 
certified mail, not some other method of sending notice. John Kuhni & 
Sons Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2018 UT App 6, ~~ 20-21. This Court 
only required the use of the statutory method for providing notice. It 
did not require, as did the district court, the use of a more burdensome 
method of service. 
Here, UAPA requires only that notice be mailed. So the 
Commission was required only to mail its notice, not to use certified 
13 
mail. The Commission is not aware of any Utah appellate decision 
that requires agencies to use certified mail when the applicable statute 
requires only service by mail. 
Nonetheless, the district court held that certified mail was 
necessary because the Department of Commerce's business directory "is 
open to fraud." R. 301. And yet the district court acknowledged that 
"[n]either party has presented evidence of whether this sort of situation 
has occurred in the past and how often." Id. Without explanation, the 
district court stated that certified mail would be more effective at 
reaching the right person than first class mail. Id. But none of the 
Commission's notices mailed to Mr. Price were returned as 
undeliverable. If the addresses on file for Mr. Price were erroneous, 
the notices would not have reached him whether mailed first class or 
certified. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the district court's decision should 
be reversed. 
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Respectfully submitted this 19th day of April, 2018. 
Isl Brent A. Burnett 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Solicitor General 
Attorney for the Office of Recovery 
Services 
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LEVEL II MENTORING, LLC; AARON 
CHRISTNER; MAD COW 
PRODUCTIONS, LLC; RYAN JENSEN; 
and DEREK PRICE, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 126918635 
Judge Su Chon 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Derek Price's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment, Order to Return Garnished Funds, and Sanctions. Oral argument was held 
June 19. The Cc:>urt first stayed the continuing garnishment until it could rule on the 
motion that was taken under advisement. The following is the Court's decision. 
BACKGROUND 
In 2010, Marc Cummings brought a wage dispute to the Utah Labor Commission 
("Commission") against Level II Mentoring and Mad Cow Productions. The 
Administrative Procedures Act requires a claim be "mailed" to the relevant parties, but it 
does not explain what type of mailing is sufficient to provide notice. See_ Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-4-201 ("When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the 
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agency shall: (i) mail the notice of agency action to each party."). The Commission 
adopted a standard mailing procedure: "first class mailing sent to the parties of a wage 
claim or claim of retaliation, to the last known address on the Commission's record." 
Administrative Code .R610-3-2(1). The Commission's record, in turn, is the business 
directory kept by the Utah Department of Commerce of each state-licensed business 
and its principal agents and their mailing addresses. 
Mr. Price asserts that the Labor Commission's practice was to issue a wage 
claim against the principal agents and managers of an offending business.1 Mad Cow's 
business registration listed Derek Price as its agent and manager with an address of 
3068 S. 1000 E. in Salt Lake City. Level II Mentoring's records listed Mr. Price as its 
ag7nt with an address of 553 E. 1050 N. in Orem. In September 2010, the Commission 
mailed the wage claim to Mr. Price at both addresses. When Mr. Price did not respond 
within the time permitted, the Commission entered preliminary findings in November 
2010 and again mailed copies to him at the address in the corporate records. And 
again, the Commission received no response, so in January 2011 it mailed him an order 
to pay/order on default for $12,590. Each document was sent first class mail to Derek 
Price at the Salt Lake City and Orem addresses on file with the Department of 
Commerce. 
In 2012, the Commission began this action by filing an Abstract of Final Award 
for $12,590 with the district court. The Abstract states that it is brought under section 
34-28-9 of Utah code: 
An abstract of any final award under this section may be filed in the office 
of the clerk of the district court of any county in the state. If so filed, the 
abstract shall be docketed in the judgment docket of that district court. 






Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-9(4)(a). The Abstract states that it was mailed to Mr. Price at 
the two addresses on file. None of the mailings was ever returned to the Commission 
as undeliverable. 
Mr. Price claims he never received any of the Commission's mailings and only 
learned of the judgment in early 2017 when his employer was served with a writ to 
garnish his wages. Mr. Price claims he quit fV!ad Cow in 2010 and moved to California. 
The Salt Lake Address is unfamiliar to him, and the Orem address was his residence 
years earlier in the 1990s. He denies being a principal in either Level II or Mad Cow 
and believes that the actual principals, co-Defendants Christner and Jensen, 
fraudulently listed him on the business records without his knowledge. 
Mr. Price made his first appearance in this case on February 9, 2017 with a pro 
se document titled Reply and Request for Hearing in which he states that the judgment 
was in error because he was merely an employee of Mad Cow and that the "owners 
(Aaron Christner and Ryan Jensen) used my ID provided for employment to put their 
business under my name. I had a similar thing in the state of Idaho from them I just got 
removed." In a February 17 hearing at which Mr. Price appeared pro se, the Court 
stayed the garnishment order of Mr. Price's wages for one month to see if the parties 
could come to a settlement. Mr. ·Price states that he tried several times to speak with 
the Commission but that the Commission was unwilling to alter the judgment and 
remove Mr. Price as a liable party. 
DISCUSSION 
Mr. Price now moves the Court to set aside the judgment and order a return of 
his garnished wages. The Commission argues that its Abstract of Judgment was filed 
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under the labor code, which does not provide defendants the right to collaterally attack 
the underlying merits of the judgment. 
(4)(a)An abstract of any final award under this section may be filed in the 
office of the clerk of the district court of any county in the state. If so filed, 
the abstract shall be docketed in the judgment docket of that district court. 
(c) Unless the award was previously satisfied, if an abstract is filed and 
docketed, the award constitutes a lien upon the employer's real property 
that is situated. in the .county in which the abstract is filed for a period of 
eight years after the day on which the award is granted, 
(d) Execution may be issued on the award within the same time and in the 
same manner and with the same effect as if the award were a judgment of 
the district court. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 34-28-9(4)(a). 
Mr. Price argues that the Abstract of Judgment was also brought under the 
Administrative Procedures Act, which does permit a collateral attack on the merits: 
·(1){a) In addition to other remedies provided by law, an agency may seek 
enforcement of an order by seeking civil enforcement in ttie district courts. 
(d) The action may request, and the court may grant, any of the 
following: 
(i) declaratory relief; 
(ii) temporary or permanent injunctive relief; 
{iii) any other civil remedy provided by law; or 
(iv) any combination of the foregoing. 
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agency's· order, in addition 
to any other defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend on the 
ground that: 
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued by an agency 
without jurisdiction to issue the order; · 
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant, 
(c) the defendant has not violated the order; or 
(d) the defendant violated the order but has subsequently complied. 
(4) Decisions on complaints seeking civil enforcement of an agency's 
order are reviewable in the same manner as other civil cases. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-501 (emphasis added). Mr. Price claims the Commission 
does not have jurisdiction over him due to its failure to properly serve him, and the order 
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does not apply to him because he was not a principal of the companies sued. Because 
it does appear that section -501 permits a collateral attack, the Court will address Mr. 
Price's concerns. 
First, with respect to the jurisdiction question, Mr. Price seeks relief from 
judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) for a void judgment. Where service of process is 
inadequate, a judgment is void and a district court is without personal jurisdiction. Smith 
Springs, LLC v. Fu/lingim, 2006 UT App 488, 1J 6 ("proper service ensures that an 
individual will not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."). 
Notice must be reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to give 
interested parties an opportunity to protect their interests. Under this 
standard, the proper inquiry focuses on whether the agency 'acted 
reasonably in selecting means likely to inform persons affected, not 
whether each [affected person] actually received notice. To determine 
whether the agency has acted reasonably in choosing a method of notice, 
we balance the interest sought to be protected against the interest of the 
agency. In undertaking this analysis, we focus on whether the method of 
service strikes a reasonable balance between the interests of the agency 
and the affected individual, while keeping in mind that the state's burden is 
less onerous in administrative proceedings. 
Anderson v. Public Service Com'n of Utah, 839 P .2d 822, 825 (Utah 1992) (internal 
quotations and c!tations omitted). In Anderson, the Motor Vehicle Act ·required the 
Public Service Commission to send its orders by "certified mail to the designated person 
at the address filed" with the agency. The agency tried several times to serve its order 
on Anderson by certified mail, but Anderson refused to accept it. The Utah Supreme 
Court held that the agency sufficiently provided notice by (a) sending it certified and by 
(b) sending it to the address Anderson had given the agency for the purpose of service 
of process. 
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Mr. Price argues that the Commission's policy -- sending notice of a claim by first 
class mail to the name and address of the principal agents listed in the Department of 
Commerce database - violated his due process rights to notice. It appears that notice 
by first class mail has not been addressed' by Utah's appellate courts. 
Service by first class mail may be adequate most of the time, but this situation is 
a reminder that the Department of Commerce's business directory is open to fraud 
when people can register _a business in the name of another without their knowledge or 
consent. Neither party has presented evidence of whether this sort of situation has 
occurred in the past and how often. The burden on the Commission to alter its service 
requirement to certified mail would be minimal for its outgoing mail. Certified mail would 
have avoided this situation where Mr. Price was blindsided with the judgment against 
him. Simply sending notices by certified mail would be almost as effective at reaching 
the correct person than personally serving the parties but without the burden and 
expense of paying a process server. The Court notes that certified mail would meet the 
notice burden under Rule 4 for service of a civil complaint, and the burden "is less 
onerous ·in administrative proceedings." Anderson, 839 P.2d at 825. 
Second, Mr. Price has raised a defense that he is not an employer under the 
Payment of Wages Act. Utah's Payment of Wages Act permits the Commission to 
include as a defendant in a wage claim dispute the party's "employer." The Act defines 
employer: 
"Employer'' includes every person, firm, partnership, association, 
corporation, receiver or other officer of a court of this state, and any agent 
or officer of any of the above-mentioned classes, employing any person in 
this state. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-2(c). Traditionally, the Commission interpreted employer to 
include anyone who was listed as a member or officer. Because Mr. Price was listed on 
the official records for Level II and Mad Cow, the Commission included him. But in 
2015, the Utah Supreme Court was asked to clarify "employer" under the Payment of 
Wages Act, and it held that the phrase "employing any person in this state" in the 
statute limits liability only to individuals who employ others. 
This conclusion is buttressed by long-accepted principles of Utah 
corporate law. The general rule is that a corporation is an entity separate 
and distinct from its officers, .shareholders and directors and that they will 
not be held personally liable for the corporation's debts and obligations ... 
. Had the Legislature intended to impose personal liability in contravention 
of long-standing principles of corporate law, it would have done so 
expressly as it has in other sections of the code. 
Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 UT 26, 1J 16, 345 P.3d 655 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). Consequently, Heaps held that employees who do not employ other 
employees are not personally liable under the Act.2 (The Labor Commission has since 
changed its practice and does not include non-employing officers as defendants in 
wage claim cases.) 
Mr. Price argues that Heaps is retroactive and should apply to him, while the 
Commission argues that Heaps is prospective only. · 
The general rule ·from time immemorial is that the ruling of a court is 
deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and 
prospectively. In civil cases, at least, constitutional law neither requires nor 
prohibits retroactive operation of an overruling decision, but in the vast 
majority of cases a decision is effective both prospectively and 
2 In 2017, the code was amended to define "employer" to mean the same as it is defined 
in the federal labor code: "'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in 
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency, but 
does not include any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer) or 
anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.n 29 U.S.C. § 
203(d). 
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retrospectively, even an overruling decision. Whether the general rule 
should be departed from depends on whether a substantial injustice would 
otherwise occur. 
We may, in our discretion, prohibit retroactive operation where the 
"overruled law has been justifiably relied upon or where retroactive 
operation creates a burden." For example, we have limited or prohibited 
retroactive application of decisions invalidating or reinterpreting certain 
statutes. In these cases, the challenged statute had been justifiably relied 
on, and complete retroactive application of the statute would have 
irreparably burdened the individuals or entities who relied on it. 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d .661, 676 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted). Heaps did not make 
new law but rather clarified existing law. Consequently, Heaps should be applied 
retroactively, and Mr. Price is not properly deemed an "employer," and thus is not a 
prop.er defendant here. See also Monarrez v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2016 UT 10, 1J 28, 
368 P.3d 846 (court could not find a "single case applying a decision purely 
prospectively that did not also expressly recognize the decision would significantly alter 
the legal landscape by ending or overruling a relied-upon practice, statute, or case."). 
Mr. Price's collateral attack of the judgment based on lack of jurisdiction and that 
the j~dgment does not apply to him are well taken. 
Res Judicata 
The Commission argues that Mr. Price's arguments regarding the Commission's 
finding of his liability is barred by res judicata, which requires: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, 
the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first 
suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in .the first 
action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits. 
Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 1J 20, 16 P.3d 1214. Res judicata 
does not apply ~ere because the abstract of judgment case is not a separate cause of 
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action. Furthermore, the Commission's finding of Mr. Price's liability was not made on 
the merits but was a default judgment based on his failure to respond to the charges. 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
The Commission argues that Mr. Price failed to exhaust his administrative 
'remedies. It suggests he should have appealed the Commission's decision, but the 
time in which he had to do it has ·long passed. Mr. Price has not filed a motion to set 
aside as suggested by the Commission's counsel. He called the Commission to see 
what they would do given his circumstances, and it refused to reconsider. 
Mr. Price argues that the Court should relieve him of the obligation to exhaust his 
administrative remedies. 
[T]he court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement 
to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable hann 
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring 
exhaustion. 
Utah Code Ann. ·§ 63G-4-401(2)(b). When the Court gave Mr. Price a month to 
negotiate with the Commission, the Commission refused and made it clear it would not 
change its position on Mr. Price's liability. At the hearing, counsel for the Commission, 
indicated that Mr. Price could still file a motion to set aside before the Commission. Mr. 
Price could be permitted to forego his administrative remedies and come directly to the_ 
district court. However, the wage claimant has not been made aware of this pending 
action nor the defenses that Mr. Price asserts. The Court is concerned that setting 
aside the abstract at this point would require notice to the wage claimant. 
Mr. Price asks the Court to order the Commission to return the amount that has 
already been garnished. However, the concern here is that the Commission has already 
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sent the payments to the wage claimant. The Commission no longer has control over 
the funds. It seems that Mr. Price would need to include the wage claimant under any 
motion to set aside the judgment. 
Attorney fees under bad faith statute 
Mr. Price seeks attorney's fees· under the bad faith statute. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 788-5-825. Mr. Price argues that because the Abstract of Judgment 
was filed under the UAPA, section 63G-4-501, it was obligated to first determine that the 
order was well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law. 
The commission . . . shall commence an action under Section 63G-4-
501 for civil enforcement of a final order of the commission issued under 
Subsection 34A-5-107(11) if: 
(a) the order finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that a 
respondent has engaged or is engaging in discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practices made unlawful by this chapter; 
(b) counsel to the commission or the attorney general determines 
after reasonable inquiry that the order is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law; 
(c) the respondent has not received an order of automatic stay or 
discharge from the United States Bankruptcy Court; and 
(d)(i) the commission has not accepted a conciliation agreement to 
which the aggrieved party and respondent are parties; or (ii) the 
respondent has not conciliated or complied with the final order of 
the commission within 30 days from the date the order is issued. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-108(1) (emphasis added). At this point, it is insufficient to 
demonstrate. that the Commission acted in bad faith. If it did proceed in this action 
based on a prior interpretation of the law and believed in good faith that its counsel told 
them it would not be retroactive, it would not be bad faith. However, the facts are 
insufficient to determine that bad faith has occurred at this juncture. 
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Accordingly, the Court orders that the writ of garnishment be quashed and that 
Mr. Price pursue a motion to set aside in the administrative proceeding with notice to all 
' 
interested parties. No further order is necessary. 
DATED this 1st day of August, 2017. 
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